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culmination of a policy which the National Gov- 
ernment had followed continuously since Hitler's 
coming to power. The author argues that the Brit- 
ish never seriously doubted (as perhaps they 
should have done) that Germany's ascendancy in 
Eastern and Southeastern Europe was in- 
compatible with their own survival as a European 
great power; hence they never really contemplated 
giving Hitler a "free hand" in the East, for that 
would have overturned the existing balance of 
power to their permanent disadvantage. Down to 
1939 British policy concentrated instead on "resist- 
ance short of war" and took primarily economic 
and financial forms, supplemented by occasional 
talk of colonial concessions. This policy reflected 
Chamberlain's belief in the paramount role which 
the British economy would have to play in peace or 
war and a general conviction that military combi- 
nations against Hitler, made in the name of deter- 
rence, would only bring war closer. 
After the German occupation of Prague, which 
seemed to show that Hitler's appetite was in- 
satiable, Halifax emerged as the chief formulator 
of policy and finally committed the British to the 
defense of Poland on the grounds that to do less 
would open Germany's way to the peaceful con- 
quest of Eastern Europe, thus nullifying the West's 
economic leverage on the Continent and irrep- 
arably damaging its standing with the United 
States. All this was done in an atmosphere heavily 
freighted with feelings of humiliation, uncertainty, 
and incipient panic; and it may, Newman con- 
cludes, have been done for invalid reasons, because 
it is still not established whether Hitler meant to 
compass the ruin of the British Empire. 
On its salient points the book is consistently 
persuasive and often convincing. Even so one may 
wonder whether Newman has not made too much 
of what he calls the "middle course" between 
unilateral concessions ("appeasement") and a 
sturdy defensive coalition (the "Grand Alliance"), 
for as he himself admits, the economic gambits on 
which it was based frequently had an ad hoc and 
very tentative quality. Similarly one may doubt 
whether he has got the emphases exactly right 
when he insists that the Cabinet knew for a cer- 
tainty in Mlarch that its guarantee would have no 
deterrent effect on Hitler and amounted, therefore, 
to an anticipatory declaration of war. Several of 
the book's themes and conclusions have been fore- 
shadowed elsewhere, but the controlled orches- 
tration of the whole makes this an independently 
valuable contribution to the on-going appraisal of 
British policy during the last period in which the 
delibrations and decisions of Whitehall swayed the 
destinies of entire continents. 
DONALD LAMMERS 
.Xl ichigan State I niverst(y 
ELISABETH BARKER. British I5olwcy in Soutih-East Ell- 
rope in the Second rlUorld ll'ar. (Studies in Russian 
and East European History.) New York: Barnes 
and Noble. 1976. Pp. viii, 320. $27.50. 
In recent years a number of studies have appeared 
which provide a much better understanding of the 
tumultuous events in Southeast Europe during 
World War II. Elisabeth Barker has made use of 
recently opened British archival material to pres- 
ent a detailed though narrowly focused exam- 
ination of Britain's policy in the Balkans as devised 
and implemented by the Foreign Office and SOE. 
While the work covers British policy toward all the 
states from Hungary to Greece, the author devotes 
much more space to countries other than Greece 
and Yugoslavia. 
Britain's interests in the area have traditionally 
focused on the periphery in places such as Greece 
and the Straits. During the interwar era Britain 
tended to follow the lead of France in its relations 
with the governments of the Balkan states. The 
outbreak of war forced the British to attach greater 
significance to the Balkans as a means of demon- 
strating their ability to carry on the struggle in 
Europe at a time when they were practically shut 
out of the continent by Hitler. Their efforts at 
bolstering the resistance of the Southeast Euro- 
pean governments to Nazi blandishments down to 
1941, were, as the author clearly demonstrates, 
inhibited by both a lack of resources and the fear of 
provoking Hitler and thus achieved little success. 
A clash with the Axis forces in this area was inevi- 
table as Hitler shifted his strategy from a direct 
attack on Britain to one of dealing her a blow in a 
"peripheral" place like the eastern Mediterra- 
nean. 
The author notes Churchill's desire to use the 
Balkans militarily to attack the Nazis as well as his 
concern to keep the Russians from acquiring a 
predominant position in the area after the war 
ended. She then illustrates in detail the divergence 
in outlook between the various policy and action 
branches of the government that made British ac- 
tivities in this area much less unified than many 
have presumed them to have been. Barker also 
mentions the differences of opinion between the 
British and Americans over policy concerning the 
Balkans but does not fully explore the problem. 
As the war progressed and the balance tipped in 
favor of the Allies, the British were faced with the 
unwelcome though not unexpected fact that the 
Soviet Union was now the dominant power in the 
area. Whatever assurances the British had given to 
the leaders of the Southeast European states were 
negated by the fact that, except for Greece and to 
some extent Yugoslovia, Britain's presence was 
limited to propaganda, some military missions, 
and a far from perfect intelligence network. Barker 
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argues persuasively that the British, acting on the 
basis of political realism, recognized the certainty 
of Russian dominance in Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Hungary by the summer of I 944, and accepted this 
as an accomplished fact in return for retaining a 
measure of influence in an area of real interest, 
Greece. 
The author's choice of a year-by-year and a 
country-by-country approach results in a large 
number of chapters (twenty) and inescapable frag- 
mentation and repetition in the narrative. A third 
of the text is devoted to the period from 1939 to 
1941 and the rest to the years 194i and 1944. An 
annoying though small number of typographical 
errors (half a sentence is missing on page 230) do 
not significantly detract from the considerable 
worth of the book. 
GERASIMOS AUGUSTINOS 
Ulniversity of South Carolina 
PHYLLIS AUTT' and RICHARD CLOGG, editors. British 
l'olz'cy Towcards 14'artime Resistance in Yugoslavia and 
(;ree-e. New York: Barnes and Noble, in associa- 
tion with the School of Slavonic and East Euro- 
pean Studies, University of London, 1975. Pp. xii, 
308. $27.50. 
This book is a collection of articles based on mate- 
rial delivered at a conference at the University of 
London in I973. M,ost of the contributors were 
participants in the events they describe. Elizabeth 
Barker's excellent piece on the foreign policy of the 
Foreign Office toward Yugoslavia concludes that, 
in priority, the Foreign Office was more interested 
in protecting the area from postwar Communism 
than in defeating Germans. F. W. D. Deakin ex- 
poses "The Myth of an Allied Landing in the 
Balkans . . ." as an American obsession, in a piece 
that supports the official histories of his British 
colleagues, Michael Howard and John Ehrman. 
Barker and I)eakin are professional historians in 
the best sense but that is not true of Bickham 
Sweet-Escott and S. W. Bailey, former SOE agents 
who seem imbued with what Barker elsewhere 
called a sort of T. E. Lawrence complex" (p. 30). 
Bailey was parachuted to Mihailovic's headquar- 
ters as Senior British Liaison Officer. His article, 
"British Policy Towards ... Mihailovic', " care- 
fully documents NMihailovic's collaboration with 
the Nazis, but his expressed purpose is to plead for 
a greater sympathy for the behavior of the Chet- 
niks. 
Three articles on Greece by Brigadier E. C. W. 
Myers, C. M. Woodhouse, and Richard Clogg are 
more thematically integrated. The three authors 
agree that the Foreign Office and Churchill were 
responsible for the Greek catastrophe by their in- 
sistent support of the king's determination to re- 
turn to Greece before a plebiscite on the mon- 
archy. All three agree that the critical point of no 
return was passed in September 1943 with the 
politically disastrous visit to Cairo of six Resist- 
ance representatives from occupied Greece. When 
the delegates insisted on discussing the composi- 
tion of the Greek government-in-exile, Ambassa- 
dor Leeper curtly terminated their visit and or- 
dered them to return. The Foreign Office 
supported Leeper. The stunned delegates now be- 
came convinced that "British policy" was deter- 
mined to restore the monarchy. This sad Septem- 
ber moment fatally set events into motion toward 
their sanguinary denouement: the British inter- 
vention and the bloody suppression of the resist- 
ance in the Battle for Athens in December I944. 
But the three authors differ as to why the For- 
eign Office should have changed its policy. To 
Myers, Communism was a false issue used by the 
Foreign Office in order to disguise its primary 
policy of restoring the monarchy. Woodhouse, on 
the other hand, has been persistently a cold war 
warrior. Nevertheless, he now concludes that the 
Greek Communist Party (KKE) was divided in 
counsel, unsure of its policy, and willing to seek an 
accommodation with the British. It was the in- 
sensitivity or lack of knowledge of these conditions, 
or both, on the part of the Foreign Office which led 
to the tragedy of the December Days. In other 
words Woodhouse has moved considerably in less- 
ening the KKE's responsibility for the fighting in 
Athens. Clogg argues that, had the British less- 
ened their support of the king they would have 
deprived the KKE of its strongest appeal which 
was to the republican sentiment of "ninety per- 
cent " of the population. Thus at the root of 
Clogg's argument one finds, again, the proverbial 
fear of Communism as the deus ex machina. These 
differences are most important because the prem- 
ises behind them measure the inadequacy of Greek 
resistance studies to date. What the three really 
disagree about is how best to restore the state, and 
they refuse to understand the Greek resistance as a 
national and revolutionary movement. 
This collection underscores the importance of 
the new documentation in the Public Record Of- 
fice but it does not offer any new historical in- 
sights. Barker (British Policy in South-East Europe), 
Deakin (Embattled Mountain) and Woodhouse 
(Struggle for (Greece, 194I-I949) have recently pub- 
lished books broader in scope. 
HARRY CLIADAKIS 
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